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ABSTRACT: The choice of exchange rate regime is a crucial decision for any economy. with 
important implications for inflation and long term economic growth. This paper uses conceptual 
and empirical approaches to show that relati\ely hard exchange rate arrangements an: I) picall) 
more suited to the particular circumstances of small island states. 
I 
Introduction 
FC\\ topics in international economics are as controversial a~ the choice of exchange rate regime 
(Ghosh et al .. 2002). The exchange rate not only has important links to inflation and economic 
growth but is itself an indicator of external competitiveness, with important implications for the 
balance of payment~. 'I he choice of exchange rate regime also bears on the duration and extent of 
cyclical fluctuations in aggregate demand. The choice ultimately lies bct\\CCil the two extremes of 
a fixed exchange rate and a tlcxible one. This would typically involve a trade-off bet"e.:n the 
reduction of volatility in real economic activity and the ability to conduct an indep.:ndem monetary 
policy. 
Theory of Rxchange Rate Regimes 
For roughly two decades after the end of the !:>econd World War. the issue of fixed versus flexible 
exchange rate arrangements was hotly debated. Economic theory stales that the choice of optimal 
exchange rau: regime ultimately depends on the source of shocks. whether they arc of a nominal or 
real namrc. Fixed exchange rates are viewed to be suitable to insulate the economy against 
nominal shocks while floating exchange rates are better at absorbing real shocks. The choice of an 
optimal exchange rate regime would also depend on the country's degree of openness. labour and 
nopital mobility ~nil th.- ~hility· to affect fiscal transfers. This is known as the optimal currency area 
theory. which argues that fixed exchange rate arrangements are best )Uited for open economics 
with flexible factor markets and effective systems of fiscal transfers. Another criterion related to 
the cnoicc of an exchange rate regime relates to credibility issues. particularly for countries with 
high inflation. Fixed exchange rate systems can be viewed to generate credibilit} h) instilling 
inflationary discipline. 
Since the brcakdo\m of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, countries have adopted a 
wide variety of regimes, ranging from pure floats at one extreme to monetary unions and 
dollaoisution at the other. However. the recent currency crises have sparked off a n.:w debate on the 
choice of exchange rate regimes. In practice, countries can only choose two of three possible 
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outcom~s: open capital markets, monetary independence and pegg~d exchange rates. In an 
increasingly globalised environment, it is often argued that only the polar regimes are sustainable. 
This hru; come to be la!0~\11 as the hollowing hypothesis. 
In sp.te of the policy relevance related to the choice of exchange rate regime. economic literature 
o!Ter~ relatively few empirical studies on the rdationships between d i ITcrcnt exchange rate regimes 
and macroeconomic behaviour. Those that do exist make no reference to small island developing 
states (SIDS). The aim of this paper is to assess v.hich exchange rate regimes have be~n more 
successful in terms of the macroeconomic pcrfonmmce ~1fSIDS. 
Churacteristics of Small Island States 
SIDS do not fare badly in tem1s of GOP per capita or in tenns of the Human Development Index 
(Witter, Briguglio and Bhuglah, 2002). However, most SIDS experience s igniticunt fluctuations in 
their GDP grov.1h rates. According to Easterly and Kraay (2000). pan of tltis greater GOP 
volatility is due to tenns of trade shocks. Given their relatively small share of world trade. SIDS 
are ultimately price takers. This makes them highly susceptible to terms of trudt:: fluctuations. 
Moreover. since a large proportion of domestic economic activity is related to ex pons and imports. 
even minor disruptions in world markets, such a~ fluctuating prices and demand can have a large 
imp~ct on the economy of a small island state. 
Economic theory suggests that the effectiveness with which countries cope with changes in their 
terms of trade shocks depends primarily on the nature of the exchange rate regime. Under a 
flexible exchange rate regime, terms of trade shocks will be offset by movements in the exchange 
rate which adjusts immediately to accommodate these shocks while it also neutralise~ the ellcct on 
inflation and export competitiveness. By contrast, a country with a fixed exchange rate wi ll 
experience substantial fluctuations in output through the monetary channel on account of 
intervention hy authorities. Therefore, the argument for a flexible exchange rate seems to be more 
plausible in this respect. 
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/\n a:lditional argument in favour of floating exchange rate~ is that a good proportion of SIDS 
specialise in the production of goods. such as agricultural products, for which demand is inelastic. 
Therefore devaluation as a policy tool Ullder fixed exchange rates is rt:stricted. Moreover. given a 
high degree of openness. devaluations are more likely to he reflected in higher domestic price 
press.1res. 
Another common characteristic shared by all SIDS is their relative))' high dependence on 
intcrrational trdde. SIDS tend to have a high degree of Opt:!nness. implying that a large proportion 
of tht economy is involved in e:\.'tcrnal trade. "Ibis high ratio howe\ er dt>es not necessarily translate 
into a dra\\hack. In fact, there are real benefits that accrue from trade such as wider choice of 
goods at lower prices. Exposure to international trade also gives domestic producers the 
opportunity to sell their products on world markets thus earning more than if they were to be 
confined to the domestic market. 
In l1tct. according to Easterly and Kraay (2000), the benefits that can accrue from this higher 
degree of openness outweigh any of the growth disadvantages related to greater output volatil ity. 
This possibly suggest~ that even though a flexible exchange rate can be more accommodative of 
external shocks, the exchange rate regime that might be best suited for SJDS is a fixed one, 
beca~se it is more conducive towards the promotion of international trade by lo~tering stability and 
predictability of export and import prices. 
Smal. economics arc also characteri~ed by limited domestic markets and by a large number or 
small firms. lhcsc small firms usually face large transport and infrastructure costs~ \\C:II as high 
unit l"Osts on account of a lack of economies of scale. Consequently an) variability in the exchange 
rate will translate in higher costs. Small states also Jack appropriate hedging dc\'ices so that firms 
cannot counteract these exchange rate fluctuations. A fixed exchange rate will eliminate this 
exch~ngc: rate risk and \\ill ultimately give producers the opportunity to plan their future 
production levels and investment plans with a lower level of uncertainty. Thi> form of stability 
\~Ould be expected to encourage trade and investment. 
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Openness to capital flows is particularly important lor small states especially since most of them 
suffe~ from large current account deficits which need to be linanced. Access to international 
finan:ial market~, not only allows small states to finance their current account deficits and to 
smoothen consumption in the face of shocks but also to share their risks with the rest of the world 
by holding claims which arc not perfectly correlated to the returns of domestic assets. Openness to 
capital flows is also expected to attract foreign direct in,·esunent (fDI) which is an Important 
source of funds for these SIDS. It is often critical in linking the more isolated small states to 
dcvclopmenL~ abroad. It leads to employment creation. increased productivit) a~ "ell as allocativc 
efficiency in the host country. :vtoreover, since most FDI targets the external sector. it can also 
result in higher export receipts for the host country as well as possible diversification in exports. It 
can be argued that fixed exchange rates, by providing more stability and an anchor for monetary 
policy credihil ity, are more likely to be conducive towards attracting 1'01 (1\izcnman, 1992) 
Vulnerability (Ill(/ Resilience 
The inherent characteristics of SIDS render them 'vulnerable'. Vulnerability refers to the exposure 
that these economies face frnm exogenous shocks and it has hccn ~tssoci<ttcd with Slf)S 
particularly because they tend to be exposed to factors which arc outside their control (Witter. 
Briguglio and Bhuglah. 2002). In fact . vulnerability has important implications on economi' 
gr0\\1h as well as on per capita output. Cordina (2004) indicate~ that vulnerability reduces the 
speed of convergence between economies at dilTerent level~ of economic development so that the 
more economically vulnerable economie~ tend to ha'e a relatively high per capita capital. This 
however is only suStained by a relatively IO\\er consumption per capita at the steady state. In the 
vulnerability indices composed by Briguglio (1992 and 1995). most of the SIDS registered 
signi:icantly high scores. However when the Vulnerability Adjusted Development Index (VADI) 
was computed, to take into account resilience. most of the small states fared better in terms nf 
vulnerability. 
Resilience gives these economies the ability to recover from the economic shock to which they are 
expo.;ed. One of the policies which should be taken into consideration in relation 1o resilience is 
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the exchange rate regime adopted. An appropriate exchange rate system can accommodate 
macroeconomic stability and strengthen the~e economies' resilience to shocks. 
A re):Ort by the General Secretary of the Cnited \lations relating to Island Developing States listed 
a number of policy options available to SIDS. One of these policy issues listed in the report was in 
fact rdatcd to improved flexibility to enhance the countries' ability to withstand external shocks as 
well as to improve their ability to compete. The exchange rate definitely meets these criteria and is 
one of the tools that must be used to reach these goals. 
Exchange Rate Regimes Adopted by SH>S 
Exchange rate strategies chosen by SIDS lend towards hard regimes. Relevant ini(H111<Jtion in this 
regard can be obtained from the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangement> and Fxchange 
Restrictions. Out of a total of43 countries "hich are considered in this study1, 44% ha\e opted for 
a regime with no separate legal tender, 30% for conventional pegs, 5% for pegs with hori:wntal 
bands and 2% for a crawling peg. Only 19% opted for arrangements involving tloating exchange 
rates. with only one-fourth of these actually using fi.tlly floating regimes (see Chrut I). 
1 rhc sample of SIDS taken in this paper are members of the Alliance for Small Island Economie< (AOSIS). AOSIS 
has a membership of fony-three member states and ob<er,er«, drawn !Tom lh" Alncan, Canhlx:an, lnd1an Ocean. 
Pacific. South China Sea and Medi1c1Tanc.an region. 
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Chart 1-Exchange rate regimes 
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Out of the eleven countries classified as having an exchange rate arrangement with no legal 
separate tender. six form part of the Eastern Currency Caribbean Union (ECCU). While these 
countries arc politically independent, their monetary policy autonomy is constrained b)' their 
men:bership in the regional economic union. !be union forces all the collllnic::s to maintain a 
dcgr..e of macroeconomic discipline through low fiscal deficits and low inflation rates. (iuinca- 1 
Bissau, another country with an exchange rate arrangement "ith no legal separate lt!ndcr. is part of 
the Western African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMC). Countries in WAEYIU ~hare a 
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comr.aon currency, the CrA Franc, which is pegged to the euro. These members have also 
implemented macroeconomic convergence criteria and an effective surveillance mechanism. The 
micro states of the Federated States of Micronesia. the Marshall Islands and Palau have adopted 
the US dollar as their domestic currency while Kiribati has adopted the Australian Oollar. 
Out of the 1orty-three member~ and observers of A OS IS, eight are not classi ficd by the !Mf in 
their Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Reference from other 
sources however indicates that the Cool.. Islands. :-.luie and Tuvalu have all adopted the ~ew 
Zealmd dollar while Nauru uses the Australian dollar. In addition. American Samoa. (iuam and 
the US Virgin Islands use the US dollar. As Jor Cuba, the exchange rate is considered to be 
'dollarised' in an infilmull but also quasi-official manner. Given the fact that this exchange rate 
system is so different from the other regimes and that data on Cuba is so limited, it was decided to 
exch:de this country from the sample of SIDS. 
There are a total of thirteen SIDS which have opted for a conventional pegged exchange rate. Out 
of these. six are pegged to the L'S dollar, two to the Euro and the rest are pegged to a basket of 
currencies. Cyprus and Tongo are the only two SIDS with a pegged exchange rat.: \\ith horizontal 
pegs while the Solomon Islands is the only small island state with a crawling peg in the sample. 
There arc six countries with a managed Jloating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate. 
Three of them- Jamaica, Haiti and Trinidad and Tobago- arc in the Caribbean region. In Trinidad 
and Tobago this managed floating exchange rate regime has helped to ensure a lo"' mllation rate 
and an orderly toreign exchange rate market in Trinidad (IMF. 2001). Singapore has also adopted 
this type of regime, allowing the Singapore dollar to fluctuate within an undisclosed target band. as 
has ~auritius and Guyana. There are only two SIDS, Papua New Guinea and Sao Tome and 
Principe that are classified as ha\ ing an independently floating exchange rate regime. 
Macroeconomic Analysis 
This section presents an analysis of the a~sociation between exchange rate regime\ and indicators 
of macroeconomic performance in SIDS. Towards this end. exchange rate regimes are classified 
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into three categories in a manner akin to Dleancy and Franci~co (2003). '1 he fir~t categor}, hard 
pegs, includes all countries with an exchange rate which has no kgal separate tender. This section 
includes a total of eighteen cotmtries, six of which form part of the ECCU. MorC\)\Cr. a total of 
nine tslands form part of the islands in the Pacific region while Guinea Oissau is the only country 
in this sub-sample which is in Africa. The soft peg exchange rate category accounts for 
conventional fixed pegs. pegged exchange rates with horizontal band~ a~ well as crawling pegs. 
This section is made up of sixteen countries spread across all the regions. '1 he last category. 
floating exchange rates is made up of two sub sections. namel) those countries with a managed 
floating exchange rate and those with a freely floating rate. There arc a total of eight countries in 
this s~ction. 
Macroeconomic indicators are viewed to influence as well as be detennined by the choice of 
exchange rate regime. l'he macroeconomic indicators considered here include volatil ity in terms of 
tmde, economic gro\\1h, the halancc of payments, fiscal and monetary pol icy. exchange rate 
competitiveness and labour market flexibility. It is to be stated at the outset that this analysis is 
concerned with establishing stylised fact.s regarding macroeconomic performance and choice of 
exchange rate regime in SIDS. The analysis of causality between these two factors can only be 
construed from the discussion, rather than rigorously analysed in view of modelling and data 
limitations. 
Terms of Trade Volatility 
SIDS with a flexible exchange rate experience the most volatility in their terms of trade (sec I able 
2). This possibly indicates that countries opting for floating regimes arc those typicall) more 
exposed to external shocks, thus placing the onus of real sector stabihsauon on the exchange rate 
regime. Conversely, those which experience the least degree of terms of trade shocks ha\'c opted 
for the hardest pegs to benefit from the advantages of international trade integration. 
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I Soft 
Hard Pegs Pegs Floatinl( 
Terms of fradc 7.5 9.8 14.0 
GOP Gro\\1h Rate 4.8 3.4 3.4 
Ex~on Growth Rate 10.5 11.5 11.7 gt 13.4 16.5 24.9 
"WER 9.7 9.1 24. 1 
REER 5.2 4.1 9.4 
Reserves 16.4 25.4 56.5 
Table 2 - Volatility 
Economic Growth 
F.conomic theory has relatively little to say about the effects of the nominal exchange rate regime 
on the gro\\1h rate of output (Ghosh et al. 1997). Typically there are two arguments. one in favour 
ol"pegged exchange rates while the other is in favour of flexible regimes. Dornbusch (200 1) argues 
that lower intlation associated with rigid regimes such as hard pegs will reduce interest rates which 
arc conducive to higher investmem and growth. In addition, when a cmmtry p.:gs its currency 
through a currency hoard arrangement or enters a monetary union, transaction costs may be 
lowered thereby spurring trade and hence gro\>1h (Frankel and Rose. 2002). On the other hcmd, 
prOp)sers of flexible exchange rates also argue that such regimes may give rise to higher growth in 
that their ability lo act as shock absorbers results in fewer distortions following real shocks (Droda, 
LIJU2, Lev)-Ye}att and Strutzenegger, "lUU3. and tdwards and Lcvy-Ycyatt, 100.3). 
Data for SIDS indicates that the average gro\\1h rate O\'er the period 1990-2002 i'> highest among 
countries '' ith flexible exchange rates at 3.1 %. followed dose!) b) countries with soft pegs at 3°/o. 
On the other hand, at 2.3%. countries \•ith hard pegs have recorded the lowest average GOP 
grO\\lh rate (sec Table 3). 
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liard Pegs Soft Pegs Floating 
GOP Gro.,1h Rate 2.3 3.0 3.1 
Export Gr0\\1h Rate 5.1 5.7 3.1 
FDIIGDP 9.2 3.0 5.3 
Fiscal Performance 2.0 0.5 -4.2 
lnfhtion 2.5 4.0 10.9 
Mo1ev Growth Rate 8.3 10.2 18.2 
Interest Rate 7.7 6.6 16.1 
Unemployment 11.0 9.5 9.9 
Current AccounVGDP -15.6 -5.1 -2.6 
External Ocbt 11.0 7.0 3.0 
T able 3-Average Macroeconomic Performance (1990-2002) 
While theoretically models are largely silent on the implication of the exchange rate n:gime on 
economic gro\\1h, there is a significant body of literature on the stabil ising properties of exchange 
rate ·egimes. Fixed exchange rates can stabilise output in the face of nominal shocks provided that 
nommal wages and prices are flexible. However in the case where prices and wages are not 
flexible and in the face of real shocks, fixed exchange rates tend to intensify output volatility. This 
appears to be the ca~e lo r SIDS as countri es with hard pegs register the highest volatility in terms 
or their gro\.\1h rates (sec Table 3). This is consistent with empirical evidence ob:.ervt:d by I.evy-
Yeyati and Sturtzenegger (2001). Edwards and Magendzo (2003) also find similar evidence 
indicating that GDP volatility has been significantly higher in dollarbed economies. than in 
countries with their 0\.\11 currencies. 
BalaJICI! of payme11ts 
Literature on exchange rate volatility and trade suggests that there is a negative relationship 
between these two variables. In fact., one of the advantages of fixed exchange rate!> is that it allows 
traders to minimise .:xchange rate risk and increase export trade. This definitely appears to be the 
case for SIOS as export gro\\1h, on average, has been the highe~t among countries witl1 soft pegs 
followed by hard pegs, at 5.7% and 5.1% respectively. 13y comparison. countries classified as 
having floating exchange rate regimes recorded the lowest growth rate at 3.1 %. l'urthermore. 
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countries with flexible exchange rates have experienced the greatest volatility in export receipts 
(sec J'able 2). 
SlDS with hard pegs as their choice of exchange rate regimes appear to have recorded the highest 
current account to GOP ratios. followed by those opting for soft pegs. Floating regimes have 
reco~ded the lowest ratios. The fact that countries '' ith hard pegs have recorded the largest rc1tios 
possibly indicates a situation \\·here the fixed exchange rah: i~ not indtcati~o: of market conditions 
and hence possibly overvalued. 
1-.xchango: rc~te movements can also alter the relative attrc1ctiveness of a country in tem1s t)f its 
attra~tiveness for FDI. Both the level and the volatility of the exchange rate are factors which 
affect the level of FDI (Renassy-Quere, 200 I). In terms of volatility, larger variance oft he nominal 
exchange rate under a flexible exchange rate will deter FDL This argument partly holds for SIDS. 
as countries with hard pegs have recorded the largest ratio of FDI to GOP, at 9.2%. but countries 
with soft pegs have recorded the lowest ratio at 3%2 J\t the same time. countries with tloating 
regimes have over the period 1990-2002 recorded an average ratio of 5.3% (see Table 2). Naturally 
there are other factors, apart from the exchange rate regime. which arc important in attracting FDI. 
Among these factors are unit labour costs, availability of resources and politicul ~lability. 
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According to conventional economic theory. mo\'ements in re~crvcs arc to be expected under 
pegged exchange rates as authorities try to meet market conditions by intervening in the market. 
On the other hand, reserves under flexible exchange rates should not adjust as any market 
adjumnents are made through the nominal exchange rate. Ho"e,·cr. data for SIDS indicates that 
mo,ements in reserves ha,·e been amplified under flexible exchange rates as oppo"<!d to hard and 
soil pegs (sec Table 2. These mO\emcnts in resel'\ es can probabl) be c:xplaincd by the: 
phenomenon often referred to as fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart. 2000). Gh en that these 
sma'l island states have limited access to international markets and that the adverse: eliects of 
volatility have more pronounced effects on their macroeconomic variables. it is natural that 
monetary authorities resist these variations by intervening in the market. In addition. the foreign 
exchange market for these currencies is thin so that monetary authorities must intervene in the 
2 Suriname has been excluded from thjs sample as the ratio was raLhcr erratic over 1hc sample period 
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mar~et. l'herefore despite the fact that these countrie~ are classified as tl()<lting. it appears as 
though in reality they may be peggers. 
Fiscal n11d Mo11etnry Policy 
Con·;entional '' isdom indicates that fixed exchange mtes pro,·ide more fiscal discipline than 
llcxihle exchange rates. The underlying reason behind this belief i~ that lax fiscal policies result in 
a rundo"n in reserves and this \\~II ultimately jeopardise the sustainability of the peg. What the 
con,entional wisdom fails to take into account is that a fixed exchange rate regime also gives 
policy makers an extra incentive to run fiscal deficits because the inflationary costs of such actions 
will only be manifested in the future - a future which hy political standards is too far to wotT)' 
about. At t11e same time, it can also be argued that under flexible exchange rates, imprudent fiscal 
policy will also incur costs. Flexible rates allow the effects of unsound fiscal policies to manifest 
thcn-.sclves inm1ediately through movements in the exchange rate. Therefore. under a flexible 
exchange rate bad behaviour gets punished immediately (Tornell and Valesco, 1995). 
Evidence from S!DS indicates that while hard pegs appear to impose more fiscal discipline as 
opp(lsed to flexible regimes, the san1e argument does not hold hetwcen soft pegs and floating 
regimes. Once again it 
must be borne in mind that me direct relationship between the exchange rate regime and the fiscal 
balance also depends on other characteristics such as economic and political fundamentals. initial 
le\'el of dc,·clopment, debt. access to capital market~. institutions and budget making rules. 
The theory on exchange rate regimes and inflation is rather extensh c The predominant vie" is 
that pegged exchange rate regimes. when accompanied by consistent macro policies. can be an 
imponant anti-inflationary tool (Ghosh er al. 1997, Quirk. 1994 and Romer. 1993). 'I his is 
essentially based on the belief that a pegged exchange rate may influence inllation hy imposing 
monetary discipline. Moreover, a pegged exchange rate provides a highly visible commitment 
which raises the political costs of loose monetary and fiscal policy. 
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Inflation performance over the three ditlerent regimes is consistent with other empirical work 
(Lc\y-Yeyati and Sturtzenegger, 2001, Ghost eta!. 1997. Bleaney and Fielding 2002) as inflation 
rate~. on average, have been lowest among countries with hard pegs and soft pegs. The average 
inflation rate was highest among countries with a flexible exchange rate at 10.9%3 .. At the same 
time, hard pegs and soft pegs recorded an average inflation rate of 2.5% and -1% respectively (Sec 
Table 2). 
Literature on the welfare costS of inflation sugg~sts that unexpected mo,·emcnts in inflation matter 
just as much as the average inflation rate (Ghost ct al. 1997). i\s expected, volaulity in pric~s is 
higher under a lloating exchange rate regime (see fable )In fact the standard deviation in the CPI 
index is around 25% under a floating exchange rate. 16% under a soft peg and 13% under a hard 
peg. Therefore not only do countries with hard pegs have. on average, lower inflation but they arc 
also associated with lower in.Oation variability. There also tends to be a negative relationship 
between volatility in prices and average GOP growth. Therelore higher price stability under both 
hard and soft pegs has, celeris paribus, resulted in higher average GDP gro,~th. 
A typical argument supporting the coJmection between pegged exchange rates and inflation is 
linked to the disciplinary effect on monetary policy. Data for SIDS indicates thut hurd pegs have 
regi!tercd the lowest monetary gro\~th rate. In fact the average growth rate IWCr the period 1990-
2002 stands at 8.3% for commies with hard pegs. J 0.2% tor countries with ~on pegs and 18.2% lor 
countries with a floating exchange rate regime. 
This indicates that gi\en that the monetary growth rate is more subdued under a hard peg. there 
tends to be more credibility associated \~ith this regime. In fact. the sustainabiliry of the peg forth~ 
ECCB is related in pan to the growth rate of money growth. fhis is essential!) linked to the lower 
inflation rate which theso:: coumries have experienced. 
'J he most direct way to examine credibility effect~ is through interest rates. Unfortunately. most of 
the interest rates over the sample period have been administratively set and thus they bear little 
1 Th<e higher average inflation rate among countries with a lloabng exchange rate, pa1ticu1ar1y in 1992, was due to hign lofllltlon 111 
J•m•lc•. 
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relationship to !.he market. However from !.he limited dala that is availahlt: it appears that both hard 
and soft pegs have lower interest rates compared to floating exchange rate regimes. 
E.xcltange Rate Competitiveness 
The key theoretical concept underlying both the anal)sis of regime effects and real exchange rate 
beha,iour is more generally known as the Purchasing Po\\er Parity Theorem. As can be seen from 
Table 2 llexible exchange mtes have exhibited more ,·olatilitr as oppo>.~:d to hard and soft pegs. 
The1e arc various studies which have stressed the point that RER ·~ exhibit substantial volatility 
under floating regimes as opposed to fixed exchange rate regimes (Mussa, 1986, Raxter and 
Stockman. 19R9). This higher volatilily a~sociated with flexible exchange rates is viewed as a 
disadvantage for llexible exchange rates as opposed to hard and soft pegs. Thi;. is b.:caus.: the 
higher variability implies that cotultrics with floating regimes in this sample have their economic 
fundamentals out of line with their potential levels. The fact that the REER is so volatile implies 
that countries with flexible exchange rates are not moving towards their equilibrium level in a 
smooth and steady motion. The potential levels referred to above relate to tltc internal and external 
balances where the internal balance refers to the economy operating at full employment while the 
cxtemlll balance refers to a sustainable current account position4 . 
Funheflllore. as can be seen from Table 2 the ~ER index is also more volatile amongst countries 
"ith lloating regimes. The fact that floating regimes have experienced the most volatility in temts 
of the nominal and real exchange rate has led manr observers to believe that the connection is 
causal: that nominal exchange rate movement~ ha\'e been a source of costly swings in rdati\.: 
prices (Eichcngreen, 1989). In the case of llexible exchange rates it appears that the exchange rdt<: 
has not provided sufficient protection from foreign disturbances or the autonomy for domestic 
policies. '1 herefore in tefllls of movements in the real exchange rate. it appears that one of the 
advantages often cited for flexible exchange rates - that of neutrdlising foreign shocks · does not 
hold as strongly as expected. The apparent reason behind thi~ argument is that benefits from a 
• /In ol1cn cited drawback of the PPP tl1eorcm is thar ir fails to take into acc(luntthc evolution of these fundamentals. 
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flexible exchange rate cannot be attained tmless countries have the necessary and appropriate 
policies backing this regime. 
Labour Market 
Economic li!Crature rdated to exchange rate regimes and empiO) ment ind1cates that given that 
exchange rate volatility is negatively related to trade and investment, then this volatility can also 
be d~trimental to employment. Data for SIDS ho\\e\·er indicates that hard pegs have recorded the 
high~st unemployment rates. 5 
General O••erview 
A general overview of the key economic aggregates over the three ditlercnt regimes for SJ DS is 
shown in Chart 2, whereby 3 signifies the best performance and 1 refers to the worst perlormance. 
As can be seen from the chart, hard pegs have outperformed the other twt• 1·egimes for most of the 
macroeconomic indicators. 
In fa:t over the sample period, hard pegs have performed better in terms of attraction of FDI, fiscal 
surpltl~ and discipline in monetary growth. Hard pegs have also recorded high export b'l'0\\1h, 
albeit slightly lower than soft pegs. Yforeover, countries \\~th thi~ type of exchange rate regime 
have recorded the lowest average growth rate in inflation coupled '' ith lo'' volatility in pri~es. 
'I his howe\t:r appears to be coming at the expense of mort: instabilit} in the GOP gro\\1h rate (see 
('han 3). In fact. this regime has experienced the largest \Oiatility when it comes to the averdge 
GOP gr0\\1h rate but has more than compensated in terms of the h>\\t:st \'Oiatility in e~port growth 
und price variability. 
Soft pegs have also performed particularly well in terms of export growth and a low average 
unemployment rate (although this indicator may be unrepres~ntutiv(!). In addition. the interest rate 
recorded under this regime has been the lowest among the three diJli:rc:nt samples. followed 
' It shoold however be mentioned that data on this indicator is extremely hm•ted and despite the use or three different sources, there 
are stl l many observabons wlllch are missing. Therefore in the absences of more comprehenSive data, no dear ooocluSton can be 
deterrrlned as to which exchange rate regime is more conducive towards lower unemployment. 
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closely by that recorded under hard pegs. Countries "ith soft pegs have also registered the lo"est 
\Oiatility in terms of movements in the 1\cER and REER indices as well as volatility m the 
average ClOP growth rate although it is very similar to that record by floating regimes. Therefore it 
appears that countries with soft pegs, have managed to peg their currencies wisely, so much so that 
vo latility in terms of these indicators has been minimised. On the other hand in tem1s of (iscal 
perfnm1ance and altracting !'[)[,countries with soft pegs hav~:: rt!conled the lowest ratios. 
External Debt 
Current Account . 
Unemployment 
-Hard Pegs 
GOP Growth Rate 
3 
Money Growth Rate 
- Soft Pegs 
Chart 2- Avernge Macroeconomic Performance 
l 
FDI 
Fiscal 
Floating 
At the same time, while avt!rage GDP growth has been highest among COLmtrics with flexible 
exchange rates. this regime has performed the worst in terms of four indicators- average inflation, 
monetary discipline, high interest rates and the growth rate in exports. Flexible exchange rates 
have also registered the most volatility, a~ out of the six indicators analysed for instability. floating 
exchange rates have recorded the largest volatility in five of them. This is somewhat expected for 
small states and in fact it has been recognised that the costs of an independent currency ma) 
actually be higher for small countries (De Brouwer. 2000). The burden of mrming a sel uf 
institutions that can effectively and efficiently manage un independent exchange rme and monetary 
17 
polic} can be significantly high for these countries. Be~ides, the foreign exchange market in these 
countries is too thin so that it is particularly difficult to rely on the market alone to determine the 
exchange rate. 
Reserves 
REER 
-Hard Pegs 
Chart 3- Volatility 
GDP Growth Rotc 
~ 
0 
NEER 
_ ___ --Soft Pegs 
Export Growth 
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Floating 
<liven the apparent better macroeconomic behaviour under hard pegs, one questions why these 
small states. despite their similar characteristics. do not all opt for hard pegs. In fact, Ilillain: 
(2001) indicates that the most viable alternative for small stales with undiversified economics may 
be the option of currency boards. Indeed, most SIDS throughout the different regions appear to be 
con~idcring harder pegs either through currency unions or dollarisation. Either way, discussions 
have commenced and the issue is not going Ulllloticed. 
Conclusio11 
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The ~rincipal conclusions from this research study are that SIDS which have opled for hard pegs 
such as currenc} unions and dollarisation ha,·e on average performed better than SIVS with 11ther 
forms of exchange rate regimes, particularly floating ones. 
How~ver, while a hard peg appears to have been an imponant factor in terms nf these 
macroeconomic indicators, this better performance appe<trs to have come at the expense ol' more 
volatility in GDP. This in itself is an imponant factor for SIDS as higher volalility in GDP can 
have a strong negative effect on grow1h (Ramey and Ramey. 1995). In fact the average (iOP 
grow.h rate was lowest amongst countries with hard pegs. 
This however docs not mean that countries with hard pegs should abandon their regimes. Rather 
what it does mean is that these SIDS should put more emphasis on bui lding resilience in order to 
cope with their vulnerability. SJDS need to build nurtured resilience in order to overcome their 
inherent vulnerability. Witter, Briguglio and Bhuglah (2002) suggests that SIDS should foster 
strategic alliances to overcome their size constraints and they should adopt policies to strengthen 
both their public and private institutions so as to target capacity building. In addition. the 
importance of good governance and sound macroeconomic managt:mcnt cannot be undermined 
parlicularly as the two arc requisites for competitiveness (Briguglio and Cordina. 2004). 
Authorities must also implement pmdent macroeconomic policies which are c11nsistent \\ith hard 
pegs such as prudent monetary and fiscal policy. Moreover, while more liberal trade m1d financial 
mlcs will assist SIDS in increasing their economic efficiency they must be supported by the 
appr\lpriate policies particularly fiscal soundness and a strong financial system. 
It b also important to bear in mind that the choice of an exchange rate regime is not a static 
decision but a dynamic one which has to he revised often to reflect the economic developments of 
the cownries. As these small SIDS develop economically and institutionally. considerable benefits 
will accrue from the adoption of a nexiblc: exchange rate system. Therefore despite the fact that 
hard pegs appear to be the best regimes for SIDS at this particular point in time. it doc~ not 
necessarily mean that this line or argument should not be questioned in the l'uture. In fact as is 
19 
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widely recognised 'there is no single currency regime which is right for all countries or at all 
times' (Frankel, 1999). 
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